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T o w a rd s a  th e o r y  o f  n a tu r a l c o n c e p tu a l iz a t io n
A.J.J. van Breemen, J.J. Sarbo, and Th.P. van der Weide 
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
A bstract. The focus of this paper is on the early phases of ER-modeling 
consisting of the prim ary conceptualization of the underlying application 
domain. To this end we introduce a process model for the generation of 
meaningful concepts for a domain description. In virtue of its close rela­
tion w ith cognitive activity, this process model also enables the modeler 
as well as the user to  comprehend the concepts of the resulting domain 
in a natu ra l way. Beyond this goal, natu ra l conceptualization opens the 
possibility for the introduction of a uniform representation enabling the 
efficient com bination of knowledge obtained from different stake holders 
during a modeling process.
1 In trodu ction
At the start of writing a collaborative paper for an ER conference the authors 
are gathered around a table. All of them  have a general notion of the problem at 
hand -conceptualization-, but each of them is experiencing the problem differ­
ently. Interaction Man experiences the problem in terms of stake holders, roles 
and utility. He has been working on structured methods for retrieving as much 
reliable information out of his informants as possible and to get it validated. 
Model Man experiences the problem in terms of concepts swimming around in 
clusters, th a t need to be brought to greater unity. He has been working on a 
theoretically informed model th a t enables him to get as much unity as the con­
cepts allow. Also present is Reflection Man. He has been talking with his both 
co-authors separately and got convinced tha t both have something of value to 
add to the conceptualization issue, but he also learned how they value each oth­
ers work. Interaction Man claims tha t Model Man ventures a model tha t is far 
too theoretical and will not yield any fruit of practical value. It is just a big 
head resting on weak legs. Model Man on the other hand claims tha t Interac­
tion Man is far too practical to yield any sustainable result on the long term  in 
our quickly changing culture. It is like a body moving around almost without 
brains. At this point Reflection Man is ready to  settle for a sequencing of both 
contributions: Interaction Man gathers the clusters of concepts tha t are brought 
to unity by Model Man. That is how they experience the problem at the start 
of their collaborative enterprise.
During the first meetings everything goes according to the expectations of 
Reflection Man. Since both stake holders are mainly concerned with their own 
contribution and regard the work of the other as being not their responsibility,
they simply divide the writing space and discuss the content in terms of para­
graph headings. But, as work progresses and the pages get filled, Model Man and 
Interaction Man start to  get an interest in the line running through their collec­
tive argument. They have to, if only because there is no chance of acceptance 
of the paper without a line of argument. So they start close reading each others 
contribution. This greatly affects the next meetings. The stake holders start to 
raise pertinent questions about each others work from their own point of view. 
Thus they greatly enlarge their focus. This also is the moment they try  to  look 
again at their own work through the eyes of the other. As a result they sort out 
the ingredients they have to work with. Then they start to figure out in what 
possible ways both approaches complement each other. As a consequence they 
start questioning Reflection M an’s assumption tha t the output of Interaction 
Man is the input for Model Man. The relation might be far more intimate and 
they find out tha t the relation will lie somewhere on the continuum between a 
strict sequence, on one extreme, and a complete merge on the other. Eventually 
Interaction Man, with his practical bend, notices tha t the writing process they 
went through seems to match the model proposed by Model Man and suggests 
that this offers a possibility for a first practical test. Model Man in response 
satisfies his need for harmony by adding tha t in tha t case they must not forget 
to pay attention to the interactional aspects and the practical constraints that 
forced them  not to postpone decisions indefinitely.
The above sketch shows some im portant characteristics of conceptualization. 
It is a process in which we aim to make explicit and reconcile knowledge in a 
(semi-)formal model. The knowledge involved has been generated with the aim 
of realizing goals in processes tha t themselves serve a common goal. Concep­
tualization itself also serves the common goal. Its aim implies tha t from the 
viewpoint of the common goal, it offers an excellent occasion to execute control.
The knowledge involved in each process is tightly knit with the goal it serves 
to realize. This shapes the attitude of the stake holders of different domains. It 
is only natural that, as a rule, they will understand and value other processes 
from their own habitual point of view. Reconciliation starts with the decision 
to consciously subsume knowledge needed for the different processes under the 
common goal. But this only expresses the intention. In order to realize the in­
tention, it is necessary to explicate the domain specific knowledge in such a way 
that the stake holders of related domains are able to understand and value what 
is going on. This is most easily achieved if each domain is explicated according to 
a uniform  natural model. For, in tha t case the stake holders get acquainted with 
the form in which knowledge is conceptualized when their knowledge processes 
are modeled. This familiarity with the form comes in handy when stake holders 
of different domains partake in Information System (IS) building. It is here that 
our process model for natural conceptualization fits in. Its main characters are:
1) It reduces the continuous stream of reality to a finite amount of types of 
meaningful interpretation moments;
2) It conceptualizes hierarchically, not just by means of collections. The hierarchy 
is not dictated by a previously accepted ontology, but arises naturally in the 
course of the analysis [7];
3) Its goal orientedness provides means to ensure terminological consistency by 
keeping track of the processes in which common terms figure.
In actual practice the conceptualizer is not either of the type Interaction Man 
or Model Man. (S)he must have reconciled both attitudes. This person can be 
best compared with the cultural- or social anthropologist doing fieldwork: (s)he 
must be a Jack of all Trades. The main difference being tha t whether it will be 
a representation oriented or an intervention oriented project does not depend 
on the choice of the investigator, but on the assignment agreed upon with the 
contractor.
Below we will present our process model for natural conceptualization. Since 
the model is founded upon the processual semiotics of the American polymath 
Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914) we will start in section 2 with a treatm ent of some 
basic notions: process (2.1) and sign and habit (2.2). This treatm ent is also 
the occasion to argue tha t our way of conceptualization offers organizations the 
opportunity to execute self control. The more technical part of the paper starts 
in section 3. In this section we outline the model, treat it from the perspective of 
cognitive activity (3.1) and from the perspective of sign recognition (3.2). Next 
we give it a logical interpretation (3.3). An illustrative example is presented in 
section 4. Finally, in section 5 we will draw conclusions.
2 H ow  to  control conceptualization?
If we confine our scope just to ER-modeling, it is possible to say tha t ER-models 
are used to create an accurate reflection of the structure of part of the real world 
in a database. But already if we only modestly extend our scope and ask what did 
trigger the modeling of a domain, we are forced to a more elaborate answer. The 
first thing to ask is what we do when we model, is it capturing real world events 
in a reflection or is it a m atter of modeling our organization’s future interactions 
with the world? Even with a narrow view on ER-modeling the answer must be 
that, at the very least, it is not only a m atter of representation. For, although 
ER developed in order to remove redundancy and keep data consistent, if we 
implement a (normalized) model, we affect the behavior of everybody who is 
going to work for some reason with the realized information system.
W ith the rapid integration of information systems across departments, the 
growing model of entities and relations became hard to read. Contact with the 
users’ demands was restored by specifying separate business processes, followed 
by a de-normalization of the overall ER-model from the perspective of the needs 
of the different roles engaged in those processes. Dimensional Modeling [6], for in­
stance, nicely illustrates this trade off between data-demands and user-demands. 
Notice tha t this procedure presupposes the existence of a normalized ER-model.
But how to proceed if we do not have a normalized model and/or the domain 
to be modeled is extensive, hosting different perspectives, stated in terms that
may be vague or tha t lead to  contradictions, in an environment where differences 
of interest seriously hamper progress [3]? Here controlled conceptualization may 
make a difference. In the remainder of this section we will deal with our back­
ground notions as a preparation for the presentation of the model with which 
we deem controlled conceptualization feasible.
2.1  P r o c e sse s  an d  c o n cep tu a liza tio n
The concept of process is central to our approach. This is not primarily so 
because conceptualization itself can be regarded a process or because it is part 
of an embracing process aiming at the realization of an IS. The primary reason for 
taking process as a central concept resides in the fact th a t all we feel, think or do, 
is only felt, thought or done as part of some process(es). From the point of view 
of meaning as actualized meaning, processes are the basic units of meaning, not 
terms or concepts. The latter generalize over different processes by dissociation 
from any particular process. This will be clear if we realize tha t disambiguation as 
a rule proceeds by providing a proper context, thus embedding the ambiguous 
sign in the process intended by the utterer. Stake holders will be inclined to 
think about their concepts from the perspective of the processes in which they 
are embedded. So, explicating processes is a quite natural starting point for 
conceptualization. Since processes figure so prominently in our approach some 
words about our Peirce inspired understanding of the concept of process is called 
for. Hulswit [4] (p. 193) succinctly summarized the Peircean concept of process 
thus:
A process is “a continuous sequence of events tha t derives its unity or 
internal order (distinguishing it from other processes) from a final cause, 
which directs the sequence to  some end state which itself may evolve.”
Several notions in this definition deserve some elucidation.
A process is a continuous sequence of events:
a) Continuous because events in a process are not separate from each other.
b) Events because there are distinguishable parts of a process tha t can be 
articulated as facts expressed in propositions.
Unity or internal order is derived from a final cause:
a) The goal of the process, the desired end state, provides the Reason of the 
process.
b) Only what contributes to the realization of the goal ought to  be part of the 
model that describes the process.
The final cause directs the sequence to some end state:
An event starts up a goal oriented habit tha t governs the process towards its 
term inating event.
The end state itself may evolve during the process (recursively):
The term inating event needs not to be fixed beforehand in detail, it may be 
general or vague.
Compare the process of registering a new client at an insurance company, with 
the process of designing and building a house or a process of learning from 
experience by repetition.
Organizations or interest groups always exist in order to achieve some end by 
a diversity of means; this makes it fairly possible to regard the organization as 
an encompassing process embracing all kind of sub-processes tha t are at any 
stage more or less subservient to the common goal. Conceptualization is one of 
those sub-processes. It is however a rather peculiar sub-process tha t ultimately 
aims at an increased articulation of all involved processes in order to be able to 
increase the quality and efficiency of the overall system. Much more can be said 
about the consequences of our interpretation of processes for conceptualization. 
Here we suffice with one last remark. By taking the final goal as criterion for 
distinguishing what does belong to  a given process from what does not belong 
to it, we are better able to make conflicts of interest visible at an early stage in 
IS design. This applies to interest conflicts in processes th a t serve the common 
goal (e.g. between management and teachers in education going digital). But 
this also applies to conflicts as a result of goals tha t do not serve the common 
goal in a direct way (e.g. oil companies and environmental obligations) or even 
hinder it (e.g. issues of authority).
In this section we looked at processes in a very general way, now we zoom 
in on the different kinds of aspects tha t we must distinguish in all the kinds of 
sign processes, including the sign processes pertinent to IS.
2.2  S ig n s , h a b its  an d  co n c e p tu a liz a tio n
Peirce did hold from very early on th a t we have no power to think without 
signs (cf. CP 5.265).1 But if every thought always partakes in a sign, then the 
flow of thought, as far as it is connected and influential, is representable by an 
argument. So, it need not wonder us tha t throughout his life he kept refining 
his thought on signs, leaving us a tremendous corpus devoted to the study of 
signs in many of its aspects. This most certainly is not the place to trace the 
development of tha t thought or to lay bare the ramifications of the assumption.2 
In the space at our disposal we will not even have the possibility to deal with the 
bare essentials of the core of his sign theory, but at the same time we will have 
to present an advancement of the basic theory which comes down to a transfer 
of the concept of ‘sheet’ from his logic to his semiotics. We start with the later 
and will afterwards introduce the relevant terminology ‘on the fly’. In section 3 
we will go into more detail.
In analogy with the ‘Sheet of Assertion’ (Sa ) Pierce introduced in the context 
of his logic (cf. CP 4.396), we introduce a ‘Semiotic Sheet’ (SS). The difference 
between the two is tha t the Sa represents what is taken for granted to be true of 
the Universe of Discourse by all participants in an exchange of ideas, while the 
SS represents all tha t is believed by a group of participants or by an individual.
1 A reference to  [8] is given by volume and paragraph, separated by a point.
2 For more inform ation on Peirce: h ttp //m em bers.door.net/arisbe /arisbe .h tm .
Let us assume tha t the SS has at least two modalities. The actual SS holds what 
at a given moment actually is believed, it is the state the SS is in at any given 
moment. The potential SS contains all beliefs th a t may become actualized some 
time.
Now, under the assumption tha t all thought is in signs, lets try  to describe 
what happens if something demanding attention gets inscribed on a SS in the 
state it is actually in. See fig. 1 for a summarization of technical terms (left) 
and their approximate counterparts in mundane language (right). Although the 
9 terms suggest th a t they are signs on their own, this is not the case. They 
are best regarded as analytical moments tha t surface if we are going to analyze 
goal oriented processes or argumentations. To give an impression of our broad 
interpretation of an argumentation: Taking a defensive stance is the conclusion 
derived from an approaching fist as a minor and a suppressed major, i.e. the 
habit tha t determines this particular reaction.
argum ent 
/  \  
dicent symbol 
/  \  /  \  
rhem e index legisign 
\  /  \  /  
icon sinsign
\ /  
qualisign
reason
factual /  "'s  . ■
existence convention
qualitative ^  ^  ' ' ' ' ' '  , 
p o s s ib i l i ty  connecti^ n
likeness actual event
\ /  
quality
Fig. 1. Peircean sign aspects and corresponding m undane term s
The terms of fig. 1:
The qualisign position indistinctly involves all th a t is needed to reach a con­
clusion. Analytically it involves what is offering itself for interpretation (the 
effect), the actual state the SS is in and all th a t may be contributed by the 
SS written upon in the process of interpretation. State and effect appear as 
indistinct qualities.
The icon position discriminates the state and effect according to their form, 
but without any interpretation. It is the single occurrence of a potential like­
ness. Looked at it from a bottom  up perspective the process can go on many 
directions, none of which is recognized at this point.
The sinsign3 position indicates the co-occurrence of the state and effect on a 
particular SS as an actual event. Commonly known as Token.
The index position indicates the actual connection of all moments involved in 
the interpretive process, by this it expresses the permanence of a process on 
a SS. At the same time it expresses the latent connection between what is 
actualized in this process and what is potentially contained in this actualized
Ss .
3 ‘Sin’ as in ‘singular’.
The legisign generalizes the occurrence (sinsign) of the instances of a form (icon). 
In learning this is a bottom  up process, but if the form is known the actual 
event triggers a rule-like habit tha t classes all the instances of tha t form with 
a type. A legisign only surfaces by means of its instances, but as a habit it has 
a real influence.
The rheme position indicates the moment the form (icon) in its here and now 
actuality (sinsign) addresses the SS in order to  retrieve all possible ways in 
which to deal with it, to contextualize it, but only potentially so. Creativity 
heavily draws upon this moment: figuring out how to possibly deal with the 
input (qualitative possibility).
The symbol position indicates the moment a familiar sign (legisign, involving a 
sinsign-icon) gets connected (index) with a habit of interpretation th a t connects 
the sign implied in the effect with its object. Object here used as in “W hat is 
the object of your remark?” The stronger this convention, the harder it is to 
be creative. At this point however the habit is still not operational.
The dicent indicates the position in which a specific possibility is asserted for ac­
tual use in the argument in a particular case. Out of all possible interpretations 
one is actually asserted (factual existence).
The argument position indicates at least two moments. On the one hand it 
indicates the whole process leading to the conclusion/response as its reason, 
on the other it states the conclusion/response, ready to  enter a subsequent 
process.
W hat does this approach offer to conceptualization? In order to establish 
that it is useful to introduce a third modality of the SS, the modality of law or 
operational habit. W hat is inscribed on a SS in this modality has real influence 
and as such fulfills the essential function of a sign, according to Peirce:
“It appears to me tha t the essential function of a sign is to render inef­
ficient relations efficient, -  not to set them  into action, but to establish 
a habit or general rule whereby they will act on occasion” (CP 8.332).
But isn’t tha t the kind of sign we want to develop if we are building an IS, 
at a level as much integrated as possible? In order to realize that, we regard 
our Domain Experts as Semiotic Sheets tha t contain the knowledge we need. 
The Conceptualizer can be regarded a sheet on which the habits of Interaction 
Man and Model Man are written. When we analyise we write the results on 
different sheets, for each process to be modeled one. We do this by combining 
the sheets of domain experts and the Conceptualizer until all tha t is needed for 
the processes is made explicit. We merge and sequence the different sheets on a 
sheet in which the common goals are regulative. Practical constraints, conflicts 
of interest and ambiguities will arise in the process. But they have a reason and 
can be discussed in an understandable way, since they can be connected to what 
is going on. That offers prospects for resolution. The question we pose may be 
summarized thus: Is it possible to develop a robust strategy for conceptualization 
by taking a Peircean semiotic account of cognitive activity as a starting point?
3 T he m odel: a recap
The theory of knowledge representation assumed in this paper was first intro­
duced in [1]. Promising applications have been presented in [9] and [10]. Ac­
cording to  [1], knowledge arises from the observation of ‘real’ world phenom­
ena. Such a phenomenon is an interaction between an external effect and the 
observer, appearing as a state (the actual SS). State and effect, which are in 
principle independent hence a duality, are two types of entities tha t are quali­
ties. Let us mention tha t there may be any number of qualities involved in an 
interaction, but according to this theory those qualities are always distinguished 
in two collections, which are treated as single entities. The interpretation of the 
simultaneous appearance of the input qualities, as knowledge, is modeled as a 
process.
The interaction between qualities is a pre-requisite for sign recognition. But 
a quality functions as a sign, and therefore is a sign, i f  and only i f  it will become 
interpreted as such. Hence the interpretation of a quality as well as of an interac­
tion of qualities, as a potential sign, is the other condition for sign recognition, as 
a process. An interaction between qualities which develop to signs will be called 
a sign interaction. Following the received view of cognitive theory [2], perceived 
qualities will be called qualia.
3.1  T h e  p ro cess in g  sch em a  o f  c o g n itiv e  a c t iv ity
The ‘goal’ of cognitive activity, as a process, is the establishing of a meaningful 
relation between the input qualities. In order to recognize such a relation, we 
have to separate the simultaneously appearing two types of input qualia from 
each other, realize their meaning with information from the context ([C]), the 
potential state of the actualized SS (complementation) and establish a relation 
between their contextualized meaning (predication). Assuming the input appears 
as a ‘primordial soup’ ([q1 q2]), the separation of the state and effect qualia addi­
tionally requires their type-wise identification (sorting), and the representation 
of their collections independently from each other (abstraction).
In sum, the stages of sign recognition, as a process, can be defined as follows 
(cf. fig. 2). We use square brackets to indicate tha t an entity is not yet interpreted 
as a sign, and no bracketing or the usual bracket symbols, if some interpretation 
is already available.
(1) sorting: [qi], [q2 ]
the identification of the two types of qualia in the ‘primordial soup’;
(2) abstraction: q1, q2
the separation of the collections of the two types of qualia;
(3) complementation: (q1?C), (q2 ,C)
the linking of the qualia with information from the context ([C]);
(4) predication: (q1?C)-(q2,C)
the establishment of a relation between the completed qualia.
( q C )  - ( a  ,C)
A/  -\2 (4) predication 
(3) complementation
(2) abstraction
[qi k  / [q2] 
[qx q^
(1) sorting
Fig. 2. The processing schema of sign recognition
3.2  T h e  p ro cess  m o d e l o f  s ig n  reco g n itio n
In order to establish the meaning of a phenomenon, the perceived qualities have 
to be analyzed:
b) in relation to each other (what is the reason of their interaction).
In [9] we pointed out tha t the two types of analyzes can be defined as iso­
morphic instances of the processing schema. Accordingly, we will refer to them 
as process-a and process-b.
In process-a the context ([C]) is assumed to be the memory, representing 
combinatory information about the perceived qualia (which qualia occurred with 
which other qualia in earlier observations). The functioning of the memory is 
modeled as follows. The input qualia trigger the memory, which in turn  generates 
a response. This response can be either in the sense of agreement, referring to 
the recognition of the input as ‘known’; or, in the sense of possibility, indicating 
a potential meaning of the input, which can be qualified as ‘not known’ (the 
input quale is not ‘known’ as such an entity). This is in conformity with the 
assumption of cognitive theory tha t in an observation the brain may selectively 
focus on some of the input qualia, hence not focus on others. In the end, this 
process generates a representation of the input state and effect qualia, which is 
denoted by A and B, respectively, if the qualia are ‘known’ or focused, and, by 
—A and —B, if they are ‘not known’ or complementary. Notice the ambiguous 
use of A and B, as an instance as well as a type of quale. A ‘—’ prefix indicates 
that a quale is not recognized as ‘known’ (it is recognized as ‘not known’).
Process-b is an exact copy of process-a, except its ‘goal’, which is the in­
terpretation of the relation between the input qualia th a t are in the focus (A, 
B), in the light of the qualia which are complementary (—A, —B). In accordance 
with this ‘goal’, the context ([C]) contains relational information about the input 
qualia.
In process-b, the im portant representation moment is step 3. In this step, the 
input qualia are linked with the complementary signs, in accordance with the 
‘goal’ of this process and the duality of phenomena. This explains why there can 
be a relation between A and —B, and —A and B, and why there is no relation 
between A and —A, or B and —B . Indeed, A and —A (but also B and —B) arise
a) in themselves (what do we know about them from earlier observations) and,
due to the same input trigger, indicating tha t the two signs are not independent. 
In process-b, sign recognition is completed in step 4, in which, a relation between 
A and B is established. The three relations, which correspond to the three types 
of interactions between the input qualia, can be characterized by means of the 
meaning of their constituents, as follows (an interaction, which is a relation, 
computationally, is denoted by a ‘- ’ symbol):
A—— B:
A is ‘known’, but B is ‘not known’ (completion of the input state);
B——A:
B is ‘known’, but A is ‘not known’ (completion of the input effect); 
(A,—B )—(B ,—A): 
both A and B are ‘known’ (establishment of the input relation).
If both A and B are ‘not known’, interpretation terminates, meaning that 
sign recognition, as a process, does not actually happen.
Control can be executed at three different levels. First, in the classification 
of the qualia as complementary or in the focus. Second, in the mediation by the 
relevant context, in which the context implicitly determines the relation between 
A and B through the common meaning of —A and —B (both are complementary 
signs of the same phenomenon). Third, in actualizing tha t relation in a ‘propo­
sition’, which is a hypothesis (A ‘is related to ’ B or, briefly, A ‘is ’ B) tha t can 
be subject to  validation in a next process.
The processing schema, which is our uniform  representation, can be used 
recursively, by means of interpreting the final sign degenerately as a quality. 
Recursive analysis can be necessary for the recognition of complex phenomena.
3.3  L og ica l an a ly sis
The above interpretation of process-b as three types of meaningful interactions 
illustrates the completeness of the processing schema. We interpret this aspect 
as an indication of a meaningful conceptualization of the observed phenomenon. 
The completeness of sign recognition, as a process, becomes even more clear 
from the logical analysis of the processing schema. The hidden agenda of this 
section is a tacit introduction of logical concepts, in the process model of sign 
recognition. W hat makes this step especially im portant is th a t logical concepts 
have a precise meaning. We pursue a logical analysis of process-b, but the results 
trivially apply to process-a as well.
An essential element of a logical interpretation of process-b, is the abstraction 
of a common meaning of the two types of input qualia, which is the concept of 
a logical variable. Because we have two types of qualia, which are independent, 
the logical interpretation requires the introduction of two variables. These are 
denoted by A (state) and B (effect). The collections of qualia which are in the 
focus and which are complementary, are represented, respectively, by means of a 
logical variable which is stated positively and negatively. State and effect qualia 
which are in the focus are denoted, respectively, by A and B; those which are
complementary by —A and —B. Notice the use of ‘—’ as logical negation, which is 
relative difference with respect to the collection of a type of qualia, represented as 
a set. For example, the complementary subsets of the A-type qualia are denoted 
by A and —A, ambiguously. Conform the above mapping, the logical meaning of 
the sign interactions can be defined as follows.
Step 1 consists in the identification of the two types of input qualia which 
are in the focus, A and B, tha t we consider to  be synonymous. As now state 
and effect are indistinguishable, as variables, the difference between [q1] and 
[q2] is expressed by means of their interpretation as a constituent and event, 
respectively. As both uniformly refer to A and B, in their logical representation 
we make use of a logical operator, indicating the type of relation between the 
input qualia. [q1] is denoted by A +B  and [q2] by A*B, representing their meaning 
as a co-existence and co-occurrence, respectively.
Step 2 is the abstraction of the input qualia which are in the focus as con­
stituents (q1 ), irrespective of the actually co-occurring other type of qualia or, 
alternatively, in relation with any other qualia which are not in the focus. This 
is logically denoted by the expression: A*—B, — A*B. It is this perspective that 
makes the two signs synonymous, which is indicated by the “,” . The other 
result of abstraction is an expression of the input as an abstract event, de­
fined by the possible co-existence or ‘compatibility’ of its abstract constituents 
(which are now interpreted differently). The corresponding logical expression is: 
A*—B + —A*B. The context ([C]) is defined by the complementary qualia rep­
resented as a co-existence (—A + —B) and a co-occurrence relation (—A*—B). 
The synonymous representation of these signs is an expression of the secondary 
meaning of the context.
Step 3 amounts to  the complementation of the abstract constituents (q1 ) 
with the context ([C]) or, alternatively, the actual meaning of the input qualia as 
constituents ((q1,C)). For example, the meaning of — A*B in context, is defined 
by the qualia complementing this abstract representation, which are: A and —B. 
Alternatively, the actual meaning of A, as a constituent, is defined by A itself 
and also by —B, the complementary qualia, linking A with B implicitly (as the 
relation between A and B is not yet realized, the qualia denoted by B cannot 
contribute to this interpretation of A). As the two expressions of A, as an actual 
constituent, are related to each other by the relation of co-existence, the logical 
meaning of (q1 ,C) can be represented as A + —B . For the same reason, as in q1, 
the two representations of (q1,C) are interpreted in the model as synonyms. The 
representation of the abstract compatibility relation (q2 ) in context obtains the 
interpretation of the input as a characteristic property appearing as an event 
((q2,C)). That event, which is a representation of the interaction between A and
B, is alternatively signified by the interaction between —A and —B. The two 
signs signify the interaction which is in the focus, respectively, positively and 
negatively. This is logically denoted by the expression: A *B + —A*—B.
Finally, step 4 is the generation of the relation between the input qualia 
which are in the focus ((q1,C)—(q2,C)). This final sign is logically represented as a 
syllogistic proposition, A is B (a potential premise for a subsequent argument).
The logical signs of the processing schema are displayed in fig. 3. Notice 
the presence of all Boolean relations on two variables, reinforcing our conjec­
ture about the completeness of the cognitive process (‘0’ and ‘1’, which are 
omitted, can be defined as representations of a ‘not-valid’ and a ‘valid’ input, 
respectively). The results of our analysis show tha t logical signs, hence also the 
concepts of cognition, as a process, can be defined as an interaction (relation) 
between neighboring signs. In fig. 3, such signs are connected with a horizontal 
line.
A is B 
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Fig. 3. The logical interpretation  of the processing schema
The above classification can be interpreted as a formal logic, defined by a 
single operation, relative difference (‘\ ’), which has three different types. The 
first is relative difference with respect to  the type of qualia themselves (sort­
ing ); the second is with respect to the other type of input qualia (abstraction); 
the third is with respect to the input as a whole (complementation). For ex­
ample, [q2]=: A*B; q2 =[qi]\[q 2 ]: — A *B+A*—B =  (A +B )\(A *B ); (q2 ,C)=—q2: 
A *B +—A*—B = — (A*—B + —A*B). In the last case, relative difference with re­
spect to the context ([C]) is interpreted as relative difference with respect to the 
universe (‘1’), which explains the use of negation (‘—’) in the definition of (q2,C).
The processing schema can be offered a semiotic interpretation as well (see 
sect. 2.2). For example, [q1], which is a representation of the input as a con­
stituency relation, is expressive of the likeness aspect of the input constituents, 
as ‘p arts’, with respect to the input, as a ‘whole’; [q2], representing the simulta­
neous occurrence of the input qualia, their appearance as an event tha t happens 
now, has the aspect of simultaneity. A more semiotic analysis of sign recognition, 
as a process, can be found in [11]. The isomorphism between the logical rela­
tions and Peirce’s classification is another indication for the completeness of the 
processing schema, as well as of the importance of its interpretation moments.
4 A n exam ple
There are two dimensions along which our theory of conceptualization can be 
explored. The first is related to its potential for merging knowledge (concepts) 
obtained by the different stake holders. This can be illustrated with the spec­
ification of a common problem, by a conceptual specialist and some domain
expert(s). Full individual specifications, each expressing a certain point of view, 
are merged to a single meaningful relation, by merging concepts of identical 
meaning aspect to a single sign, through coordination. The second way of explo­
ration capitalizes on the potential of the theory to be applied recursively, which 
is beneficial for the conceptualization of complex phenomena. This section give 
an illustration of such a problem. Let us emphasize tha t both types of explo­
ration are a direct consequence of the uniform representation provided by the 
theory outlined in this paper.
4 .1  C o n c e p tu a liz a tio n  o f  a  co m p lex  p ro b lem
Assume our task is the generation of a meaningful representation of a company’s 
strategy. From an abstract point of view such a strategy can be characterized 
by the company’s reaction on supply and demand. According to the theory of 
this paper, such a reaction can be conceptualized as a relation between supply 
and demand where supply can be interpreted as the products produced by the 
company, which are available for some time (state), and demand as the suddenly 
appearing request dictated by the customers (effect).
The simultaneously appearing supply and demand (input qualia) define our 
company as a phenomenon. The interpretation of the two types of qualia in 
themselves (process-a) provides us with a definition of A and B ,4 and through 
the interpretation of the relation between them (process-b) we may obtain a 
meaningful conceptualization of our company. That relation may also rely on 
complementary factors like the economic perspective taken, either profit maxi­
mization or purchasers satisfaction, which views in turn  are intimately related 
to the more primitive concepts of price and selling events, tha t themselves can 
be specified as phenomena. The next section is an attem pt to introduce a spec­
ification for selling events [5]; an analogous treatm ent of the concept of price is 
left to the reader.
4 .2  N e s te d  p h en o m en o n : se llin g  ev en t
A selling event is between a dealer and a customer. The specification below is 
given from the dealer’s perspective; a description from the purchaser’s point of 
view is possible, but it may be less general, as the purchaser’s motivation for 
buying or not buying a product can be more difficult to set out.
We assume tha t a selling event, as a phenomenon, is defined by the pur­
chaser’s selection of certain products and services. The products can be inter­
preted as a state, in which, the services appear as an effect. For example, dealer 
and customer are having a conversation while they are looking at collection of 
products, when suddenly the dealer recognizes (e.g. ‘sees’ in a saccade), the 
purchaser’s selection of the services he or she wishes to be delivered with the 
products. Additionally we assume tha t a selling event may also be subject to
4 We refer to  the sta tus of a sign by means of the corresponding logical expression.
complementary factors like the different forms of the transfer of ownership and 
the various judicial conditions a service may have to comply with.
The goal of this section is not the analysis of a concrete selling event, how­
ever. Our focus is on the interpretation of the relation between product and 
service, in general. Accordingly, we will assume tha t the input contains abstract 
qualia, which are: product (A), service (B), form of ownership (—A) and judicial 
conditions (—B). For example, —A may refer to purchase, lease or rental, and —B 
to copyright, know-how and organizational conditions (e.g. a computer network, 
as a product, can be sold only as a whole, not in parts). The representation of 
abstract concepts, as qualia, is a non trivial question tha t we cannot discuss in 
detail, because of lack of space. A possible solution of this complex problem has 
been presented in [10]. The abstract concepts of selling are introduced as stages 
of the recognition process of an abstract selling event, as a sign (cf. fig. 2).
[q1]=A +B : A product (A) can be sold with a service (B); or, a service (B), for 
example, a know-how, can be available through a certain product (A).
[q2] =A*B: A product may provide a certain service only; or, a service can be 
available only in combination with a certain product (product-service depen­
dency, as an actual event).
[C]=—A + —B, — A*—B: The relation between the complementary factors of selling 
events like the various forms of ownership and the corresponding judicial issues 
(—A + —B), and how those forms of ownership are regulated by law (—A*—B). 
q1 =A *—B, —A*B: Product specification like catalog information about products 
(A*—B) and services (—A*B), in general. 
q2=A *—B + —A*B: The reconciliation of purchaser’s need for products and ser­
vices, from the dealer’s point of view. This is the concept of bargaining, which is 
a law-like relation or rule between products (A*—B) and services (—A*B) that 
can be sold in combination. This rule includes the possibility tha t products and 
services can be sold independently from each other (in conformity with the ‘or’ 
operation in the logical expression of q2). For example, one may buy A without 
B (A*—B) or, B without A (—A*B), or both.
Notice th a t in this case the law-like relation identified as ‘bargaining’, a concept 
tha t most of us are familiar with, is automatically revealed by this conceptu­
alization process (except its name, of course). This indicates tha t in cases in 
which we are not familiar with the concepts they are generated by the model. 
(q1,C)=A+—B, —A +B : Product and service are the actual constituents of a sell­
ing event. This includes the full specification of product and service according 
to the purchaser as well as the dealer, tacitly indicating their agreement (cf. 
bargaining in context).
(q2 ,C)=A *B+—A*—B: The characteristic property involved in any selling event, 
defined by a suitable combination of product and service (A*B) and nothing 
else (—A*—B) or, alternatively, the relation between the selected product and 
service (A*B), in the light of their ownership forms and judicial conditions like 
the transfer of ownership through leasing or contract (—A*—B).
(q1,C)-(q2,C)=A is B: The meaningful description of the input phenomenon, as 
a selling event.
4 .3  M a in  p h en o m en o n  con tin u ed
The meaning of the nested phenomenon can be represented in the nesting phe­
nomenon, degenerately, as a quale. As a result, the meaningful concept of a ‘sell­
ing event’ is reduced to a complementary information (—B )5 mediating supply 
and demand to their interpretation as the company's supply and the customers' 
demand and, finally, to a meaningful representation of our company's strategy. 
The context of price (—A) and selling events (—B), is an expression of their close 
interaction in a market mechanism (—A*—B), but also of their possible influ­
ence as additional regulative factors, like environmental and political demand 
(—A + —B).
The interpretation of the context along a continuum marked by ‘liberal', on 
the one side, and ‘state controlled', on the other, may provide a representation 
of our company (‘A is B ’ as a conclusion), as a more commercial profit oriented 
enterprise or a more non-profit organization, respectively.
5 C onclusions and further research
For systematic conceptualization of a domain, a process model is needed. This 
has several reasons. It minimizes unwanted ambiguity of the terms used by con­
sistently extracting them  from the processes in which they function. It enhances 
communication with and between the end-users about their domains by the use 
of concepts in context. And it facilitates strategic decision making in an early 
stage of IS building by enabling the re-thinking of the processes that make up 
organizations; after all goals can be reached in different ways.
This approach is natural due to  its close relation with cognitive activity inter­
preted as a sign process. The finite amount of types of meaningful interpretation 
moments (cf. fig. 1) facilitates the development of a common language between 
designer and user. The order relation between the interpretation moments as well 
as between the processes increases the possibility to control conceptualization. 
The goal oriented nature of our processual model is well equipped to uncover 
hidden tensions by systematically keeping check of the relations between ends 
and means.
Our task for the future can be briefly stated thus: In order to really estimate 
the value of our approach for conceptualization we will have to put our model to 
actual use. In order to make our approach of practical use in IS building we will 
have to study the relations between our model and formalisms of ER. Since our 
semiotically derived model allows a logical interpretation, prospects are good. 
But as the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
5 Now —B, bu t also A, B  and —A refer to  the qualia of the nesting  phenomenon.
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